In 1996 he Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles and Public Safety launched the "Genesis" project, a technology-enabled reengineering endeavor. In September of 1999, after four years of planning, organizational restructuring and system development, the new system was released. To the accompaniment of great publicity, it fell dramatically short of expectations. This case provides the background necessary to understand the origins and shortcomings of the system, then focuses on the turn-around effort that took the system to a point of successful operation within a year of its going into production. The turn around was accomplished under great pressure to retreat to the legacy system. The effort involved a synergy of manual and technical corrections to bring overall system performance to acceptable levels. The DMV now faces the formidable challenge of taking full responsibility for the long-term maintenance of a system that was designed and implemented by outside contractors.
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DMV Size and Objectives
summarizes key budgetary and transaction information for the DMV. This information is divided by fiscal year, which runs from July 1 to June 30. There are currently about 875 employee positions within the DMV.
As a state agency, the DMV inherits much of its operational philosophy and culture from the larger governmental environment. Nevada is a balanced-budget state. Funding for all projects must be determined prior to initiation of the project; deficit spending is prohibited by the Nevada constitution. The legislature (law making governmental group in Nevada) takes pride in its role as the 
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prudent steward of public funds, and this is reflected in the relatively conservative approach to government and project management under which all state agencies operate. The legislature is an active participant in most publicly visible projects in Nevada. Since the DMV is a publicly used state agency, it is watched more closely than other state agencies. Its administration and activities are scrutinized by both the general public and legislative oversight committees.
SETTING THE STAGE
The unexpected population increases of the early 1990s gradually overwhelmed the 1970s era systems and organizational structure of the DMV. By 1994 Nevada residents were complaining so vigorously about long lines, long waits and unreliable service that a legislative subcommittee authorized a study to investigate those charges. The study, performed by an outside information systems consultant, Regional Management Consultants (RMC), found that the complaints were well founded. RMC held meetings with a diverse set of users, management, legislators, and customers. They discovered that waiting times in lines were typically over an hour. It was not unusual for a customer to stand in line only to be told that they did not have the appropriate documentation for the service they sought, and they would need to return with the proper information, to the end of the line. In addition, data indicated that staffing the field offices for adequate service, given the current organization and information technology, would require the largest personnel budget of any state department by the year 2000. The study made it apparent to the legislature that new ways of providing DMV services needed to be explored. The stage was set for reorganization. The key goals, as recommended by the study, were to: • Shift from a bureaucratic to a customer-centric organization.
• Increase efficiency of internal operations.
• Increase level of service to the public through decreased service times and increased serviceprovision outlets.
• Decrease or hold constant the cost of service. RMC recommended the DMV undertake a reengineering project to meet those goals (Grover et al., 1995) . To understand the environment of the project, the remainder of this section describes the structure of the DMV legacy information systems, the reengineering study, and the make-buy decisions that preceded system development.
Legacy Information System Description
There is a continuum of information systems operating choices available to each department at the State of Nevada, from maintaining a completely autonomous information system to contracting with the centralized Department of Information Technology (DoIT) for information systems support. The DMV elected to maintain a relatively autonomous information system with much of their hardware and network supported by their own in-house personnel. Their software was developed and maintained completely in-house.
The legacy computerized information system used a two-tiered architecture. One or more Honeywell minicomputers at each primary field office provided data entry, data validation, and screen processing, and were connected via dedicated telecommunications lines to a DoIT mainframe in Carson City. Response times were acceptable, however software maintenance had become increasingly problematic. The systems were developed initially in the 1970s and were composed of COBOL programs using VSAM files. Different versions of COBOL were used on the Honeywell minicomputers and the IBM mainframe. The programs were developed separately and were maintained separately for each major departmental function. There was little documentation, and making changes was a timeconsuming and challenging task. Legislators became painfully aware of the situation when a simple modification to the licensing program system mandated by a minor legislative change cost $60,000 and took over four months to accomplish. One programmer at the DMV ruefully referred to the systems C o p y r i g h t I d e a G r o u p P u b l i s h i n g C o p y r i g h t I d e a G r o u p P u b l i s h i n g C o p y r i g h t I d e a G r o u p P u b l i s h i n g C o p y r i g h t I d e a G r o u p P u b l i s h i n g as being "one of the best examples of spaghetti code I've ever seen." Separate development resulted in duplicate and inconsistent data among the different functions. For example, it was possible that a person's name, address and other personal information were repeated in the driver's license, registration, pollution control and insurance verification systems.
The DMV information system (IS) department employed 26 people in 1994. Of those employees, five programmers and a supervisor handled all maintenance and system administrative functions for the DMV programs, including all telecommunications issues. Employees in the IT department were relatively traditional, experienced COBOL mainframe programmers with no background in graphical or PC-based applications.
Reengineering Study Results
After the DMV received the initial results from RMC, the company hired to document and review its processes, it was clear that the current organizational structure and workflows had to be changed. The key activities recommended in the study were to: • Combine programmatic departments into two cross-functional departments: (1) field services and (2) processing center.
• Implement a new information system that could support the combined and enhanced functionality of the new departments.
• Implement new service provision facilities through technology, such as Web-based and pointof-emission-service registration of vehicles.
• Revamp the workflow and physical layout of the field offices to streamline and accelerate service provision.
The project, to be named "Genesis," was expected to take seven years for complete implementation. RMC explained that the basis for Genesis was the use of technology to support the transformation of business processes.
The DMV reorganization was "classic BPR" in many respects. The organization's problems derived from typical 1970s era "stovepipe", non-communicating divisions for each departmental service, and the inefficiencies had been codified into the computerized support systems for the division, just as in many early, widely publicized BRP efforts (Hammer and Champy, 1993) . The proposed solution too was "classic BPR": an organizational restructuring to merge and flatten the organizational hierarchy into fewer, cross-functional divisions, and an IT development project to provide computer support for the streamlined service provision. The nature of service provision for the DMV made the IT system a crucial element. The radical nature of the change in both the organization and its information systems made change management (Clemons et al., 1995) critical to the success of the entire project (Bashein et al, 1994) .
After the Director accepted the need for the project, it was clear that the first step was identifying a technology-based system that could support the newly identified requirements of the organization. Prior to embarking on a full-scale development effort, representatives of the DMV and RMC toured the motor vehicle departments of Massachusetts, Virginia and South Carolina to determine whether a system capable of meeting Nevada's requirements already existed. Meetings were also held with other states, such as California, Washington and Oregon, to see whether an existing system was available. Several members of the legislative subcommittee on Genesis had experience with prior systems development projects and felt that a purchased system might prove faster to implement, more reliable and less expensive (Nelson et al., 1996) . However, based on the requirements document, none of the systems viewed was deemed adequate in the opinion of both the consulting group and DMV senior administration.
Deciding to develop rather than purchase a system, the second step was to determine the general requirements for the new system. RMC followed recommended industry practices by working with a DMV project team (Bennatan, 2000) . The DMV project team, consisting of two DMV project managers, C o p y r i g h t I d e a G r o u p P u b l i s h i n g C o p y r i g h t I d e a G r o u p P u b l i s h i n g C o p y r i g h t I d e a G r o u p P u b l i s h i n g C o p y r i g h t I d e a G r o u p P u b l i s h i n g a representative of the DMV IT staff, end users and functional managers, worked with RMC to gather high-level requirements for the new system. RMC compiled a complete requirements specification for both the software and the client/server implementation platform.
The third step was to identify an appropriate development organization. Neither the DMV's IT staff nor DoIT staff were capable of shouldering the development effort. Neither group had the staff or resources available to conduct such a large-scale project. An RFP, which incorporated the requirements specification, was issued to help determine the best outsourcing choice for the DMV (Lacity et al., 1994) . The RFP process was time consuming because of a change in DMV management, and two RFPs were issued before the administration chose a vendor. Ultimately, International Accounting and Consulting (IAC) was the vendor with highest scores in all categories, and was chosen even though they had no prior experience with DMV systems. IAC was chosen because of their considerable experience with graphical, front-end tools and client-server development. In addition, they were one of the lowest cost bidders and proposed a very aggressive 18-month development timetable to fit in with the original schedule in the Genesis plan. The extensive software requirements document was made a part of the contract between the DMV and IAC. Thus fulfillment of the requirements (not necessarily a successful installation) determined the successful discharge of the contract.
CASE DESCRIPTION
The description below paints a picture of a failed development and implementation effort that was transformed into a working system. This section is divided into three parts that describe sequentially the development, implementation and transformation of the Genesis project.
Genesis Development Process
Driven by the aggressive development timetable, systems development began immediately following vendor selection in early 1998. The project effort was coordinated through three-way participation among project managers from IAC, RMC and DMV. IAC was responsible for all systems development. RMC provided project oversight and contributed general technical knowledge as well as high-level knowledge of the DMV requirements. The DMV assigned a project manager from the user community and formed a team of key end-users to serve as application domain experts. A member of the DMV IT staff was part of that team during the first few months of the project. All Genesis team members were moved to a separate facility set up just for the project in a building several blocks from the DMV administrative offices.
Genesis followed a rapid application development process (Whitten et al., 2001 ) with extensive user involvement through formal JAD (joint application design) sessions and iterative development through a series of prototypes. IAC decided to "front-end load" the project (Abdel-Hamid and Madnick, 1989) by deploying large numbers of programmers for the initial coding effort and maintaining that high level of manpower until the project managers were comfortable and the development timetable could be met. Between 50 and 60 programmers, predominantly Indian nationals, were brought to Carson City by IAC in 1998.
Determining Detailed Design Specifications
IAC coordinated the project by identifying distinct project "tracks" (such as driver's licensing and registration) and assigning track leaders to manage definition of the design specifications. A "framework track" developed design and coding standards, as well as reusable code modules for all other tracks. Within each track, project team members held JAD sessions to develop detailed design specifications. Additional DMV personnel, beyond those assigned to the project teams, were called in to give their knowledge and advice about the system design when deemed necessary by the DMV project team. At least 50 different users participated in the definition of the design specifications.
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Members of the DMV team noted that they saw mock-ups of screen designs daily during this time. IAC personnel would take the ideas generated during the meetings and create screen designs, which were immediately communicated to the DMV project team who shared the designs with other users.
Conspicuously absent from this process were the DMV IT staff. Little reassurance was given the legacy staff as to their place in the new régime when the new system was completed. This was a significant omission given Genesis' programmatic commitment to effective change management. The legacy IT staff had historically been somewhat isolated from the DVM at large (Geisler, 1997, pp. 78 -81) , providing necessary but little understood services. There may have been some doubt as to the ability of the mainframe-skilled group to make the transition to the clientserver technology of the new system.
While members of the IT staff participated in the JAD sessions for the first few months, they were slowly moved to "less important sessions in the tracks," according to a participant. One IT staff member said whenever he tried to participate in the sessions, he was told "to be less detailed, try and think at a higher level." He was assigned to work on the interfaces between the DMV systems and law enforcement, insurance, smog stations and other governmental entities. He noted that he persisted in bringing up details of the interfaces that were ignored by IAC and RMC. After a while, he was no longer notified about the sessions and stopped attending. The IT staff member believes that "IAC and RMC were trying to start with a clean slate, and I guess I kept trying to talk about the way we needed to do things to make them work." According to the IT Department Manager, for most of the project, occasionally "one of their registration team would come over and talk to our registration people or one of their DL (driver's license) people would come over and talk to our DL people." For the most part, however, the domain knowledge resting with the legacy DMV IT group remained untapped. This had a negative effect on DMV IT Department group morale and communication between the legacy team, and the development groups became formal, desultory and guarded.
After approximately six months, the development seemed to IAC project managers to be progressing adequately and the number of on-site programmers was decreased. For most of the remainder of the project, the number of programmers fluctuated between 15 and 25. During this time the DMV users were told that some of their user interface design specifications had to be changed to fit more easily within a computer window. They were also told by IAC that "the system will really be slow if we design it this way," referring to the user interface specifications. As a result, some of the user interface was changed. In one application, this meant that the number of screens required to complete a task grew from four to eight. Screen designs and processing specifications continued to change up to the final minutes before the system went into production.
Systems Testing and Training
System testing began about six months into the project. All project participants were responsible for testing the functionality of the system. RMC worked on data conversion, IAC tested program functions, and the DMV team was responsible for user interface and system processing. Detailed scripts were used to walk DMV users through standard transactions so that testing was consistent. A problem for the DMV users was that the systems did not work during testing. IAC was still writing the programs that were being tested. The testers were frustrated because the applications would not execute without crashing. The testers were told how the system would work and based many of their tests on those results. RMC also struggled with their tests when data from the old system would not convert correctly to the new system. Data were in unexpected formats in the old system and some of the placement was unpredictable. For example, the "mother's maiden name" field was used in the legacy system to store comments about a person's driver's license when there was no maiden name.
Training began approximately nine months into the development effort. Training centers were established in Carson City and Las Vegas, and users were brought in from outlying areas to learn how to use the new system. The system continued to evolve during this time as changes were made to both the interface and functionality of the system. These changes were made because the system continued to have problems. Many users were trained on a system that had errors and crashed during execution. A significant number of practical problems were identified during training and testing, and were more difficult to correct than if they had been observed earlier in the development cycle (Jones, 1995) . However, the very aggressive schedule and evolutionary development cycle made it difficult to identify those errors earlier.
Developing a System Architecture
The Genesis computerized information system architecture is shown in Figure 3 . PCs replace the dumb terminals connected to the Honeywell minicomputers of the legacy system and serve as the entry devices to the system. PC LANs are placed at the field offices and at the Carson City processing center. LAN servers from field offices throughout the state feed twin RS6000s in Carson City over T1 (1.5MB/S) telecommunications lines. The RS/6000s in turn connect to the IBM ES9000 mainframe for database access through a channel connect.
The PCs and LAN servers perform only data entry and editing functions. PowerBuilder® was chosen as the development system for the GUI interface and data validation functions on the PCs. The RS6000s serve essentially as telecommunications front-ends to the ES9000. The processing programs on the ES9000 are a mix of legacy batch applications and new applications which process field-entered data against a DB2 database using COBOL.
Transferring Knowledge Between Consultants and DMV
At the same time that IAC, RMC, and the DMV began determining detailed system design requirements, recruitment began for the "new system" DMV IT Department group who were to work with the IAC team. Recruitment was handled entirely by advertising the positions within the state personnel system. DMV management, drawing from their own hiring experiences and those of DoIT, had determined that outside recruiting was not viable due to the substantial difference in pay scales between the state and industry. According to the individual who now heads the DMV IT Department, though he applied for the position of leader of the new team, he was never interviewed or even contacted regarding his application. It appeared to one of the DMV IT Department members that senior administration at the DMV preferred "brand new employees to be part of the brand new system." Structural issues began to impede the knowledge transfer effort almost as soon as the in-house team was assembled. First, there was a communications gap between the DMV team and the IAC contractors. The formal British English spoken by the development programmers with a variety of dialectic inflections was frequently unintelligible to the Nevadans and vice versa. Second, the contractors were under intense pressure to complete the project in the least possible time. Though teaching and some level of knowledge transfer were specified in the contract, this had little effect on the programmers "in the trenches." They felt they had no time to teach, and so little teaching occurred.
Genesis Implementation Effort
A pilot implementation of commercial licenses and registrations was performed about three months prior to the intended go-live date for the rest of the systems in order to check the efficacy of the systems. The pilot implementation experienced problems with invalid data conversion and program bugs, but these problems were believed to be isolated within that specific application.
The targeted go-live date was rapidly approaching and many project participants were concerned about the integrity of the new system. Target go-live date was scheduled for July 4, 1999, based on a balance of considerations: (1) a three-day processing window was required for the conversion and this required a holiday weekend; and (2) the next holiday weekend after July 4 th was Labor Day, almost two months later. Starting a few months before the proposed go-live date, a "war-room" was set up to closely monitor the progress of system development. Members of RMC, IAC, DMV and DoIT participated. Application testing with users took place continuously during this time and a considerable number of 'bugs' were discovered. Many of the bugs were usability problems rather than outright software errors, but of such magnitude as to demand correction. The problems were fixed, but the nature of the problems frequently led to changes in the appearance and functioning of the input screens. This had the effect that users, who were necessarily trained in shifts at different times, were trained on versions of the system that were different from each other and different also from the version deployed at go-live.
Much consideration was given to the implementation approach for the project. The key stakeholders decided to use a "big bang" implementation approach because of issues involved with computer system connections between the DMV and other entities. It was decided that all field offices would use the new system at the time of implementation. It would have been almost impossible to maintain database consistency with parallel systems or selected locations for implementation, so the project participants believed that the only way to implement the new system was all-at-once. This approach usually requires extensive testing to ensure minimal problems (Pressman, 2001 ), but the tight deadline did not leave the DMV with sufficient time for such testing. A side effect of the "big-bang" implementation decision was that the only fallback position was to reinstate the legacy system. Thus the decision was made to keep the legacy system current, and to install legacy system terminal emulation on all field office client PCs so that a return to the legacy system could be made in the event of a catastrophe with the new system.
Slipping a Much-Publicized Deadline
Only days before the 4th, the decision was made not to deploy the system at that time. Looking back over nine months, the IT Director's assessment of the system at that point: was "No way was it even close
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Shortly after the missed go-live deadline, the existing Deputy Director resigned and was replaced. The missed deadline was highly publicized and thus problematic for all elected officials sponsoring or even generally favorable to the project. The new Deputy Director was widely viewed as a troubleshooter for the project, and had ready access to the Governor to augment her own substantial knowledge and authority. She quickly became familiar with the details of Genesis system development, and increased resources were brought to bear on development within a week. Since much of the 'back end' system code turned out to be legacy code, the legacy team finally became a serious player in the project. With the installation of the new Deputy Director, Genesis had a strong internal champion (Geisler, 1995, pp. 149 -153) for the first time since the resignation of the original director, three years earlier. The level of hands-on management of the project also increased dramatically, and this would prove vital following the unsuccessful initial deployment of the new system.
The attitude in the war-room became more determined. RMC assumed an increased oversight role and continuously evaluated the system and the fluctuating number of bugs. In hindsight it is apparent that the "acceptability" of the system was highly subjective. What would have been considered unacceptable early in the project became increasingly acceptable as external criticism of the system increased and another go-live possible date, Labor Day 1999, approached. In the end the decision to deploy fell to the Deputy Director in close consultation with the Governor. According to one of the legacy team members, "[she] made a call to the Governor and he said 'make it happen.'" The external political forces behind the scenes in Genesis since its inception are quite apparent in this decision process.
Going Live and Failing
The system went live over Labor Day weekend 1999. Although it was anticipated that there would be some initial confusion, the first use of the system was, in the words of many high-ranking DMV employees, "disastrous." The publicity campaign the DMV had mounted to curtail the demand for services during system ramp-up had just the opposite effect. Many people feared the new system would be unable to provide them with services in a timely fashion and came in before they actually needed to, turning concerns about system overload into a self-fulfilling prophecy.
On the morning of go-live, lines at DMV offices quickly lengthened to stretch outside the buildings and wind through the parking lots. Within 20 minutes of the start of business, the field office terminals were effectively dead. Diagnostics quickly narrowed the focus to telecommunications hardware. Transactions were getting to the RS6000s but not to the ES9000 mainframe (see Figure 3) . DoIT and IBM then discovered and fixed the undersized channel connect between the RS6000s and the mainframe (see Figure 3) . A major hardware problem was resolved by noon of the first day of operation of the new system. Still, transaction times for the new system remained far longer than for the legacy information systems, and it was obvious to the customers that the service personnel were very uncomfortable with the new technology. By evening, customers who had been waiting more than eight hours were turned away. Disgruntled customers contacted the media, and the following weeks were a horror of publicity for the slow, unresponsive DMV system. The publicity brought more customers to the DMV (those who wanted to be on television and in the papers), which contributed to longer lines.
While some of the problems with the new system had been anticipated, others had not. Still other problems were known, but their severity under actual operating conditions had been underestimated. The issues causing the most severe problems were: • Complex screens that were difficult to understand and slow in operation.
• System design requiring many screens to complete a simple transaction. • Last-minute software changes introduced many minor but undocumented procedure changes. In effect, technicians faced systems on which they were untrained.
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• Memory leaks caused system crashes requiring as many as 15 PC reboots per day.
Genesis Turnaround Activities
Ongoing negative publicity brought DMV administration to question whether they should return to the legacy system. That strategy was actually demanded by several angry legislators. DMV administration, however, in concordance with several influential members of Genesis' legislative oversight committee, decided to stay with the new system because they believed it was the only way to cope with the state's population growth in the long term (http://www.leg.state.nv.us/70th/Interim/ Statcom/Genesis/). Although well intended, this decision brought on even more intense pressure to decrease transaction times and stem the deluge of negative publicity. It became clear that the many software bugs had to be brought quickly under control.
Managing the Problems and Fixing the Software
Given the huge number of problems and finite programming resources, directing resources became a problem in itself. The mechanisms that were already in place to identify, log and classify problems into "critical" and "non-critical" bugs were made more robust. To deal with the training issues and eliminate the constant distraction of the programming staff, a three-tiered system resembling a familiar "help desk" environment quickly evolved. Error reports are now phoned to a facility in Las Vegas staffed by field technicians with long-term experience with the DMV, and with both the legacy and new systems. This tier filters out and handles training problems. True software errors, or requests to change extremely cumbersome interface elements, are made electronically by the Las Vegas facility to the programming staff in Carson City.
The field technicians gained more say in prioritizing problems, and most of their issues revolved around the complexity of the entry screens. A solution to this problem has turned out to be highly problematic. DMV administrators want to gather more data during transactions than were gathered with the legacy system. Additional forms and data entry must be performed to achieve that end. While simplifying some forms would be a possible solution to the entry problem, it would also preclude additional data collection. In addition, the programming framework, which helped IAC generate the interface quickly, requires that certain data be accessed hierarchically to work effectively. Some forms must be accessed before others or the system will not work. The result is that field technicians are forced to enter more data through multiple hierarchically related forms. A few forms have been condensed but most remain multiple-screen entries. IAC agreed to extend their contract and offered additional hours to fix problems and repair screens since the DMV IT department has virtually no experience with PowerBuilder. Ultimately, however, it may be that field technicians will be forced to adjust to a system that is more complex and difficult to use than the legacy system.
Fixing Hardware/Software Compatibility Problems
The most frustrating problem for field technicians was the apparently unreliable hardware in the field offices. PCs locked up and crashed up to 15 times each day. A combined team of people from DMV, DoIT, and IAC finally pinpointed the problem as incompatible versions of the Windows operating system and PowerBuilder®. This was an unanticipated problem and necessitated hardware and software upgrades of all workstations. It took almost six months to find the error, and then another 4 months to complete the upgrades. During that time, the morale of the field technicians plummeted, and many of them became convinced that the Genesis project was a failure.
Workflow Changes at the Field Offices
Even while expending resources to repair the software and make it usable, the DMV put additional resources into increasing customer satisfaction. The process modifications that in many ways produced the greatest perception of improved service involved customer routing and work flow rather than computer system reprogramming. Before Genesis, customers entering the DMV buildings found C o p y r i g h t I d e a G r o u p P u b l i s h i n g C o p y r i g h t I d e a G r o u p P u b l i s h i n g C o p y r i g h t I d e a G r o u p P u b l i s h i n g C o p y r i g h t I d e a G r o u p P u b l i s h i n g themselves in a large room rimmed with multiple service booths. There were a few signs explaining which booths provided which services and there were no information desks. While unable to change the physical plant, the DMV radically improved service with three key elements: immediate routing of customers by free-roaming service representatives, a 'first stop' help desk and a service queuing system dubbed 'Q-matic'.
Customers entering the DMV are now immediately greeted by a service representative who determines the service the customer is seeking and ensures that the service is available at the site. The representative then routes customers to a multi-station help-desk that determines that the customer has all the information and documentation required for the service prior to being assigned a number for the next free service booth. After the help desk, customers take seats in a waiting area in the center of the facility. The Q-matic assigns numbers to customers on a first-in-first-out basis, similar to a paper number at a delicatessen. Numbers are assigned electronically to free technicians on a sequential basis. That number is displayed in red LEDs over the free service booth, and announced by a synthetic voice system over a public address system. There are helpful signs placed throughout the office.
It is important to note the synergistic interaction of multiple re-engineering changes -manual and computerized. The Q-matic resource assignment system would have been much less effective without two other process changes: 1.
The Genesis project computer information system design allowing any transaction to be completed at any workstation; and 2.
The cross-training of technicians which was required to allow service booths to perform multiple functions. Another important aspect of the re-engineering was the training received by all employees in customer service attitudes. Though very difficult to quantify, the effects of the 'attitude adjustment' by DMV employees have been widely reported in the press and favorably received by DMV customers.
Providing New Services DMV management also decided to accelerate the development of computerized services such as Web-based services and alternate registration methods to alleviate crowding at the field offices. However, as for other states that have implemented alternatives to DMV office visits, usage remains slight to date.
Genesis Project Current Status
In March of 2000 the contract with RMC was prematurely terminated because the new DMV Deputy Director believed that the organization could handle all project oversight activities in-house. A month later all 4,000 hours of the extension contract with IAC, negotiated just after deployment of the system, had been used. The DMV was suddenly on its own with respect to Genesis.
Creating a New IT Team in the DMV
The IT personnel and organizational change management tasks facing the DMV during that time were daunting: (1) to merge the DMV's legacy and "new system development" teams into a coherent unit; (2) to structure the combined group to effectively maintain the increasingly sophisticated application; (3) to overcome programmers' resentment of the new system; and (4) to overcome the persistent view of the field technicians that the new system was inferior to the legacy system.
With the full support and constant encouragement of the new Deputy Director, rapid changes were made in the DMV IT Department: The entire department was moved to a single physical facility, a new manager was put in place, the department was reorganized to fit the new functional requirements of the system and project leaders were established. Training programs were established and programmers were encouraged and enabled to become familiar with the new technology of the system.
The Genesis project was intended to take seven years for full implementation with completion . At the time of this case, the project was in its fourth year and was slightly ahead of the scheduled implementation. However, Genesis was originally forecast to cost a total of $34 million over the seven years, and had already cost approximately $40 million. The cost overruns and negative publicity resulted in a legislative subcommittee to review the project. An independent consultant was hired to evaluate the project; however, the results from these reviews have not yet been made fully public. In summary, a large, difficult information systems development and implementation effort was delivered and labeled a complete failure. Through a series of manual process changes and software reprogramming efforts, public perception of the DMV has meaningfully changed and there are fewer complaints about inefficiency and poor service. Yet as the public trends toward a more positive view of the DMV and its services, members of the DMV IT Department worry about the long-term viability of the system and users grumble about the interface.
CURRENT CHALLENGES / PROBLEMS FACING THE ORGANIZATION
The most significant challenges currently facing the DMV can be categorized into technical, managerial and data integrity issues.
Technical Issues
This system will continue to evolve as state and federal requirements change, so the DMV IT staff must be capable of performing frequent modifications to all system components. Significant additional training and systems knowledge will be required by the DMV before they are able to fully maintain the existing functionality and grow the system as requirements evolve. No one in the DMV IT Department has much experience with PowerBuilder or LAN-based systems beyond the working experience they have gained on the project. Almost all of the contract programmers who did the actual work on the interface have left and are unavailable for consultation. While high-level design and requirements documentation exists, it does not always reflect the substantial number of changes made during the frenetic reprogramming immediately following go-live.
Members of the DMV IT Department are also concerned with the behavior of the system during scheduled batch updates. Some of the updates, such as yearly registration renewals, were not programmed correctly during development. Few of the batch updates were tested completely prior to go-live, so the actual performance of all programs is still to be discovered.
Administration of the Genesis database, a DB2 application running on a DoIT-housed ES 9000 mainframe, is a function handled outside the DMV IT Department. Currently, as it has been since the initiation of the project, the database is administered by a single technical specialist from IBM. Although this function is effectively and capably handled, the specialist has expressed a desire to relocate at some point in the future, and it will become necessary to bring database administration in-house.
Many of the technical problems originated with or are severely exacerbated by the lack of success of the technology transfer effort. The need for technology transfer to the permanent staff -training in the basic technologies and experience with the actual system as designed-was understood at project inception. Devising techniques for countering the problems experienced by the DMV and many other organizations with technology transfer remains an open IS research issue.
Managerial Issues
The shift to a more complex technology requires a larger and more sophisticated in-house IT department than pre-Genesis. Each of the tiers in the system, the PC LANs, the RS 6000s and the ES 9000 mainframe run a different operating system, and support different programming languages and utilities. In order to effectively maintain and grow the new system, the current DMV director of IT has estimated that 21 additional, new technical positions are needed (the staff has already grown by 10 people over 1996 levels). However, a common misapprehension has arisen with respect to the nature of complex information systems that is shared by some members of the Nevada legislature and general public: the belief that an information system, once developed, can be treated as an appliance, such as an automobile or a refrigerator, providing sophisticated functionality while requiring only occasional maintenance. The result of this perception problem has been to make obtaining funding for the proper support and growth of the system more difficult than otherwise. In fact, several members of the Genesis legislative subcommittee were surprised to find that the members of the "new" IT group were being merged with the legacy group; they had assumed the new group would be disbanded when development was complete. This will be a difficult issue for DMV management to cope with during upcoming legislative budgeting sessions.
Another staffing issue with long-term implications for the success of the system is the difficulty in hiring qualified IT professionals. The new system requires client/server and GUI design and programming skills, however industry salaries for persons with these skills are 30% higher than state scale. Just as for the original "new system" team, the salary disparity has led to a strategy of hiring exclusively from within the state government and attempting to "grow" the required skills through training. The problems anticipated with this strategy, as experienced by similar organizations in similar situations (Knock and McQueen, 1996) are twofold. First, once trained, technical employees realize their value and leave state positions to take jobs in industry. Second, the time required to build the in-house expertise to deal with the sophisticated system already in place can jeopardize the success of the project.
Although the user interface for the system is cumbersome and resistance to it among field personnel is high, DMV IT staff eventually determined that the requirements for multiple screens originate in the system core architecture. Baring a full-system rewrite, the screen sequence is fixed and no technical interface simplification is possible. Thus a technical issue has become a management issue requiring ongoing expectation management (change management) for the field staff who must use the interface. Currently this consists largely of field supervisor "pep talks" that emphasize the flexibility and additional functionality of the new system. Eventually employee turnover will reduce the number of field staff who still recall the simpler legacy system interface.
Data Integrity Issues
A third challenge is that of data integrity-coping with the entry of conflicting or erroneous information into the database. A significant quantity of duplicate, conflicting and inaccurate data entered the new system during the conversion from the multiple legacy database systems to the new database. Additional conflicting data has resulted from relaxing the editing and data validation standards built into the original, complex screen sets and also from an incomplete definition of required validation during the design of the system. Some of the data has been corrected by batch programs applied to the new database, but much remains to be corrected manually or by more sophisticated batch programs. Data integrity has a large impact on staffing. According to the manager of the IT Department, this is an expensive system flaw. "Five seconds of data entry by a 20K/year clerk takes six hours of 60K/year programmer time to correct."
Final Comments
In summary, Genesis remains a reorganization in process. Many of the intended structural changes to the organization, the flattening of the management hierarchy and the empowering of personnel through extensive cross-training have been accomplished. From an organizational culture perspective, the transition from a bureaucratic, program-driven organization to a customer centered service organization has been successfully completed. Further, the workflow reorganization at the C o p y r i g h t I d e a G r o u p P u b l i s h i n g C o p y r i g h t I d e a G r o u p P u b l i s h i n g C o p y r i g h t I d e a G r o u p P u b l i s h i n g C o p y r i g h t I d e a G r o u p P u b l i s h i n g service centers and the increasing availability of alternatives to visits to service centers have successfully changed the perception of the DMV to that of a forward-looking, courteous and efficient organization. However the continued success of the new divisional structure and its streamlined service provision depends completely on the success of the new computerized information system. Many of the technical problems remaining to be resolved with regard to that system are known, but others may arise as new yearly processing occurs. The primary challenges are managerial: to bring sufficient resources to bear on the technical problems, to provide ongoing funding for the resources, and to structure the resources in a stable, effective information services department within the division. 
